Self-Determination Without Strings

IN HIS "REFLECTIONS ON KOSOVO AND NATO," Steve Shalom makes clear in his opening paragraph his judgment that those on the left who either endorse NATO bombings or rally to the defense of Milosevic have adopted approaches which are "deeply flawed morally and politically." That position, rooted in a commitment to democracy and socialism, and argued forcefully in his essay is a rare and much-needed contribution to the discussion.

Laudable as Steve's opening paragraph is, I believe his formulation would have been considerably stronger if accompanied by an equally unambiguous endorsement of the Kosovars' right of self-determination which is inseparable from their right to bear arms to defend themselves from Milosevic's assassins and to win independence. Steve does come out in favor of Kosova's right to self-determination but it arrives late in his essay and here, I believe, placement reflects his tepid and inconsistent support.

In the long history of movements claiming the right of self-determination there have been many grey areas. There are no such grey areas in Kosova where 90 percent of the population consists of a persecuted people with a distinct culture, living in a geographically designated area, and who, in their vast majority, have made clear their aspiration for national independence from a cruel and alien despotism. This fails to come across loud and clear in Steve's article.

If the Kosovars are entitled to self-determination as Steve formally recognizes, then they are entitled to struggle for it by all means necessary and consistent with the democratic nature of that just cause. They will never gain their freedom except through their own struggle. Obviously, it will never come from Milosevic but neither will it come from Clinton and his similars who are clearly prepared to cut a Rambouillet-like deal with Milosevic in which that tyrant remains in power, the alleged "integrity" of Yugoslavia is guaranteed at the expense of the Kosovars' right to self-determination, and their popularly based fighting force, the KLA, is disarmed. Under these circumstances, I do not understand any of Steve's arguments in opposition to the KLA arming itself. He makes the argument that it is too late for the KLA to use arms effectively against the national oppressors, that it would be suicidal. Perhaps so. But that is really for the KLA to decide, not either Steve or me. And if it is too late today, it will not, I hope, be too late tomorrow. For the sake of that tomorrow, I believe it is essential that the left support arming the KLA today.

Steve is also reluctant to see the KLA armed for fear that those weapons might be used to terrorize Kosova's Serbian minority. But if one opposes arming the KLA for fear it might engage in its own ethnic cleansing then logically one should be opposed to the Kosavars' right to self-determination. For, if the Albanian majority, in an independent state of its own, falls victim to a revanchist virus, then whether or not the KLA is armed, the Serbians would be victimized. The absence of an armed KLA would provide little assurance of safety for the Serbian minority.

In any case, the KLA, no matter what its origins, from all evidence I have seen, is not a narrow terrorist group but a mass movement that is diverse and enjoys the growing support of the Kosovars. That it has killed Serbian policemen - that is, the thugs who have been murdering and plundering the ethnic Albanians - is hardly surprising and no cause for upset. That the KLA has also committed atrocities against Serb civilians is probably true and deplorable but such random killing is definitely not a pattern of KLA operations.

Steve appears to want the equivalent of a guarantee from the KLA that in the event it achieves its military and political objectives, it will respect the rights of the Serbian minority. I don't know what could be given as a meaningful guarantee. Actually, an important KLA official, Jakup Krasniqui, was quoted in the May 7, 1999 New York Times recognizing that the Serbs in Kosovo deserve the same rights as "every other minority in democratic Europe." Nevertheless, it would be foolish for anyone to deny that an enraged Kosova populace might commit acts of violence against Serbian civilians. But that possibility, not to be dismissed lightly, cannot be used as a pretext for denying arms to the KLA. It is just as reasonable to posit the possibility that a well-armed KLA would be a moderating influence in an independent Kosovar state, restraining violent manifestations against the Serbian minority.

Remember that in Kosova there were 1.8 million ethnic Albanians and less than 200,000 Serbs. More than half the Albanians have already been forced out of their homes, thousands (perhaps tens of thousands) murdered, women beaten and raped, homes and villages looted and burned, a vast army of disoriented exiles threatened by disease and malnutrition in camps not equipped to cope with their basic needs. These and all the other attendant horrors of Belgrade's ethnic cleansing have been carried out by 30-40,000 Yugoslavian troops barracked in Kosova. But not by them alone. There are also thousands in paramilitary units drawn from the small Serbian population of Kosova who have proved themselves no less savage than the Belgrade legions. In addition to the Serbian paramilitaries, all the evidence reveals that thousands of local Serbian civilians have also engaged in the most wanton acts of destruction. Statistically, then, a significant proportion of the small percentage of Serbs in Kosova has participated in the massacres and pillaging. To insist, under these circumstances, that the KLA must give convincing assurances that it will be scrupulous in defending the rights of the Serbian minority in Kosova is simply not a reasonable criterion for its right to bear arms. This is especially true since the Albanian victims of ethnic cleansing cannot point to any significant movement of Serbian democrats who have denounced Milosevic's gangster regime for its crimes in Kosova and expressed solidarity with the Kosova people's fundamental democratic right to self-determination. However, understanding the rage in no way suggests condoning violence against innocent Serbian civilians.

A question to Steve: if you consider it wrong for the KLA to expand its arsenal, do you believe it should be obliged to surrender the arms it already has?

I was also made a bit uneasy by the emphasis that Steve places on the distinctions between genocide and ethnic cleansing. The point is a legitimate one but it need have been made only once. In repeating the point, the differences between genocide and ethnic cleansing tend to be exaggerated and the very real horror of ethnic cleansing minimized.

ONE FINAL POINT, less a criticism of Steve's article than an observation about the mournful state of the U.S. left. There has been little effort, if any, to place the terrible events that have wracked Yugoslavia for most of this decade in any meaningful historical context. More than a few in the left involved in the discussion on Kosova believe or believed that for 40 years or so Yugoslavia was a socialist state, enjoying at least a kind of socialism which, by definition, should have heightened people's consciousness and humanity. If that is or was so, how explain the regressive history of Yugoslavia in this decade: a corrupt and criminal regime in Belgrade, ethnic cleansing in Kosova, Bosnia littered with mass graves of thousands, a resurgence of fascism in Croatia where wartime collaborators and puppets of the Nazis have been rehabilitated with honors.

In my view, this is part of the legacy of Titoism, a less brutal version of Stalinism which was thoroughly anti-democratic, anti-socialist and effectively set itself the task of destroying the political culture of socialism. What is the view of those who were supporters of Titoism? No less important, what do the horrors of this decade in Yugoslavia reveal to the left about the nature of those societies which masqueraded as socialist? And what lessons are to be learned for building a movement for democratic social transformation?

Contents of No. 27

Kosovo/a Discussion