Lichtenstein's Fictions Revisited Race and the New Labor History

Editors' note: Herbert Hill's critical essay-review of Nelson Lichtenstein's biography of Walter Reuther, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit, Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor appeared in the last issue of NEW POLITICS Volume VII, No.1. Nelson Lichtenstein has written a rejoinder and Herbert Hill's rebuttal appears below. We invite further comment.

HERBERT HILL is Evjue-Bascomb Professor of African-American Studies and Industrial Relations at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He is the former Labor Secretary of the NAACP and is now writing a study of the legislative history and enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

 

NELSON LICHTENSTEIN IN HIS REJOINDER RELIES ON LONG EXTRACTS from his biography of Walter Reuther to convince the reader that my criticisms are "wildly off-base," but he fails to address the specific points I make. Before focusing on the substance of his response, however, a few comments are in order on the tone and style Lichtenstein employs and which, in an exchange such as this, also reveal much about content and methodology.

My review of Lichtenstein's book, if severe, was supported by detailed documentation, copious references and what I believe to be judicious arguments. Yet Lichtenstein responds with outrage and the shocked disbelief of an innocent victim of a savage and unprovoked "assault" by a Herbert Hill wildly shooting from the hip as he splatters his target with "venom" and "invective." Since Lichtenstein charges me with violating proper standards of scholarly discourse and debate one would expect his response to be a model of historical objectivity and personal decorum. But this is not the case, since Lichtenstein does not hesitate to dismiss my criticism as the work of someone who is "blind, willful and self-contradictory." Pleased with his selection of pejorative adjectives, he repeats his diagnosis of Hill as "willfully blind," the author of a work that is "disorganized, disjointed and ahistorical," suggesting that I suffer in addition from a mild form of mental retardation, i.e., a deficiency in "reading comprehension," or that, at the very least, "Hill needs a new pair of glasses. . . ." Such juvenile polemical thrusts are unworthy of comment. What I do object to, however, is Lichtenstein's insidious, mendacious and defamatory attack on my life's work and reputation, the consequence I can only conclude of his inability to make a credible defense of his treatment of race in the Reuther biography.

My specific criticisms of his book reveal that according to Lichtenstein, "Herbert Hill's world is one of Manichaean polarities." More serious, if less pretentiously put, is the claim in his opening paragraph that my criticism of his biography "will further [!] damage [Hill's] reputation as a legal scholar and civil rights historian" and that "Herbert Hill's failure to grasp the actual argument offered by my Reuther biography. . . brings into question the reliability of his historical work and the validity of his judgments on a whole range of parallel issues."

Even Lichtenstein retreats from this rash judgment in his next sentence when he acknowledges that "Herbert Hill played a historic and heroic part in the African- American struggle for liberation. His place in the annals of that movement is secure." But this qualification does not right the wrong of his previous calumny since it is a logical absurdity. My "reading comprehension" might not be up to Lichtenstein's standards but I do comprehend that if the reliability of my historical work is legitimately brought "into question" then my place in the annals of the movement cannot possibly be "secure." And how "secure" can my reputation be in Lichtenstein's eyes when in a pitiable effort to explain his failure to use the considerable and pertinent material I supplied to him at his request, he now writes: "I chose to avoid reliance on Herbert Hill's personally held material, and upon the interview I conducted with him, because of his increasingly eccentric and self-serving reputation among scholars who are also knowledgeable about mid-century trade unionism and its relationship to the NAACP and the civil rights struggle." Who are these scholars? What have they written? Why does he not name them?

On a related point, Lichtenstein writes that "Hill made much of his reputation in the early 1960s, as the 'blistering' critic of the ILGWU, thus generating a high level of tension between that once liberal wing of organized labor and the NAACP." Lichtenstein has now decided that regardless of my positive historic role of a few pages earlier, it was Hill and the NAACP which, in combating the discriminatory practices of Lichtenstein's "once liberal" garment workers union, were in fact the negative and divisive parties in the developing antagonism between the ILGWU and the NAACP. It follows from the tone and substance of Lichtenstein's formulation that he is a partisan of the ILGWU leadership in this conflict.¹

In this context it is necessary to note Lichtenstein's response to my charge that he misrepresented material that appeared in an NAACP publication. I had stated in my review that Lichtenstein demonstrated "A complete disregard for accuracy when he wrote that 'Hill's 1961 NAACP report, 'Racism Within Organized Labor: A Report of Five Years of the AFL-CIO' included a blistering exposure of institutionalized discrimination in the industrial unions, especially the ILGWU. . . .'" I went on to point out that:

. . . there is no such criticism, "blistering" or otherwise of the ILGWU in the report, on the contrary, the only mention of that union is complimentary as it describes how with the assistance of the Association, they integrated their Atlanta units. This report was originally published in 1961 as an NAACP document and later reprinted in The Journal of Negro Education. (It should be noted that at his request a copy of the original document was made for Lichtenstein.)

Confronted with this evidence, Lichtenstein invokes what he calls his "sloppy citation," implying that his inaccurate account of the report is of little consequence. But this is not a matter of an incorrect reference, of an inadvertent slip in attribution. The issue is not a "sloppy citation," since it involves misrepresentation of the text. Lichtenstein invented material that is not in the document and then used the altered text to serve his purpose.

In trying to absolve himself, Lichtenstein states that Hill is "the author of a larger distortion." This is followed by a reference to my having been the "blistering critic of the ILGWU" after all, responsible for "generating a high level of tension. . ." etc., etc. Try as he may I don't think Lichtenstein will succeed in convincing many readers with such nonsense, arguing that it's all Herbert Hill's fault anyway. In his attempt to squirm out of his predicament, Lichtenstein becomes ridiculous.

On another matter I wrote that:

Lichtenstein informs the reader that Reuther made an impassioned plea for FEPC legislation, but he does not tell the reader that once enacted into law, Reuther did nothing to make the law effective, on the contrary, the UAW together with other labor unions resisted change. When Reuther finally had the opportunity to directly alter the racial employment pattern in auto manufacturing and in other industries where the UAW held contracts, he failed to attack the racial status quo where it mattered greatly, and where he had the power to do so.

Lichtenstein's response is most interesting: "all of Hill's scholarly bluster is directed at some other target, because this Reuther biography is simply silent on labor's post 1964 role in the legal and administrative evaluation of Title VII's history." (emphasis added) Why does Lichtenstein end his discussion before the enactment of Title VII? Could it be because the union's response after the law went into effect was less than admirable? In the matter of Title VII, Lichtenstein does not tell the whole story.

Lichtenstein and Title VII

IN THAT PART OF MY REVIEW CONCERNED WITH THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY of Title VII, I concluded that Lichtenstein's treatment of this history is uninformed and misleading in many crucial respects. In his rejoinder, Lichtenstein confirms my judgment. Without providing any factual information he challenges my interpretation of organized labor's role regarding the inclusion of Section 703(h) in Title VII. An extensive record shows that the leaders of organized labor believed that this section insulated established union seniority systems as the statute would in this manner be limited to future discriminatory practices. This interpretation was made abundantly clear in the course of subsequent litigation involving labor unions.

Soon after Title VII went into effect, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission began accepting complaints involving the discriminatory effects of union seniority. On May 5, 1966, AFL-CIO officials met with representatives of the Commission to insist that under their conception of Section 703(h), the EEOC must not assert jurisdiction over seniority complaints involving labor unions. After some hesitation, the EEOC rejected organized labors position and declared in its Second Annual Report that:

1. A seniority system which has the intent or effect of perpetuating past discrimination is not a bona fide seniority system. . . .

2. The fact that a seniority system is the product of collective bargaining does not compel the conclusion that it is a bona fide system.

3. Seniority systems adopted prior to July 2, 1965 (the effective date of the Act), may be found to be discriminatory where the evidence shows that such systems are rooted in practices of discrimination and have the present effect of denying classes of persons protected by the statute equal employment opportunities.²

The EEOC could not initiate litigation until the Act was amended in 1972, but invoking the decision in Udall v. Tallman³ where the Supreme Court ruled that "great weight" must be given to an agency's view of the statute under which it operates, the Commission filed amicus curiae briefs urging courts to adopt its position in interpreting Section 703(h).⁴

Based upon the great number of complaints received from black workers employed in diverse industries over decades, the NAACP had concluded that many unions played a major role in structuring and maintaining racial inequality within the labor force. The Association had been attacking this problem for many years and with the advent of Title VII, it was hoped that the new law would be effective in eliminating discriminatory seniority systems and segregated work units.⁵

In 1968, in the first case concerned with seniority issues under Title VII, Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc.,⁶ involving the Tobacco Workers International Union, the EEOC filed a brief recommending a strong enforcement posture and rejecting organized labor's interpretation of the statute. In Quarles, it was found that the union had negotiated contracts establishing racially segregated departments with black workers limited to the lowest paying unskilled jobs and that through the bargaining agreement it tried to perpetuate the discriminatory pattern after the effective date of Title VII. The union contract also established that black workers seeking to transfer into departments from which they had been previously excluded would lose their accumulated seniority and be required to start over again as new employees subordinate to whites with less seniority. In Quarles, the district court rejected the union's defense of its discriminatory labor agreement and stated that "the legislative history indicates that a discriminatory seniority system established before the act cannot be held lawful under the act." The court also held that "a departmental seniority system that has its genesis in racial discrimination is not a bona fide seniority system." "Congress," it said flatly, "did not intend to freeze an entire generation of Negro employees into discriminatory patterns that existed before the act." It might be noted that the author, then Labor Secretary of the NAACP, filed the black workers' complaints in Quarles with the EEOC and that lawyers from the NAACP Legal Defense Fund represented them in the litigation against the employer and the union.

In the landmark decision of United Papermakers & Paperworkers, Local 189 v. United States,⁷ the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, a year after the Quarles case, further advanced the position taken in the earlier decision. This was the beginning of a line of cases involving union seniority under Title VII, each invoking the decisions in Quarles and Papermakers, Local 189. Among these were James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co.⁸ involving the Steelworkers Union (also a defendant in Taylor v. Armco Steel Corp.)⁹ EEOC v. United Airlines Inc.,¹⁰ involving the Machinists Union, Wattleton v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers¹¹ (the author testified as an expert witness in this case), Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry,¹² involving the United Transportation Union, Williams v. Mead Coated Board, Inc.¹³ involving the Paperworkers Union, and Lorance v. AT&T Technologies Inc.¹⁴ involving the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.

In United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,¹⁵ as in many other cases, the employer joined with the union in arguing that the seniority system was protected and that relief under Title VII was prospective only. But the court rejected their position and found that:

The pervasiveness and longevity of the overt discriminatory hiring and job assignment practices, admitted to by Bethlehem and the union, compel the conclusion that the present seniority and transfer provisions were based on past discriminatory classifications. . . . Job assignment practices were reprehensible. Over 80% of black workers were placed in eleven departments which contained the hotter and dirtier jobs in the plant. Blacks were excluded from higher-paying and cleaner jobs.

Observing that discriminatory contract provisions were embodied in nationwide master agreements negotiated by the international union in 1962, 1965, and 1968, the court also noted, "The Lackawanna plant was a microcosm of classic job discrimination in the North, making clear why Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."

On October 4, 1971, the court issued a decree defining as members of the affected class some sixteen hundred black steelworkers, who were entitled to receive benefits as a result of the court's decision. It is significant that in the Bethlehem Steel case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that the job expectations of whites, based on past union seniority practices,

arise from an illegal system. . . . Moreover their seniority advantages are not indefeasibly vested rights but mere expectations derived from a bargaining agreement subject to modification. . . . If relief under Title VII can be denied merely because the majority group of employees, who have not suffered discrimination, will be unhappy about it, there will be little hope of correcting the wrongs to which the Act is directed.

This case was initiated by the Justice Department in response to charges filed by the NAACP with the EEOC on behalf of black steelworkers many of whom were members of the Buffalo Branch of the NAACP. In Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,¹⁶ a companion case brought by the Association against the company and the union, the NAACP succeeded in obtaining additional relief not sought by the government for black workers.^*

As a result of litigation under Title VII there was increased recognition that seniority rights are not vested and immutable interests, rather they are expectations of future employment status which exist subject to law. For example in United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.,¹⁷ the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a railroad seniority system that had been developed through fifty years of collective bargaining agreements was not immune from remedial measures intended to provide relief to black workers. It held that work rules and other provisions in union contracts in the railroad industry were susceptible to court ordered remedies and relief under Title VII. According to the 5th Circuit, union contracts "do not carry the authoritative imprimatur and moral force of sacred scripture, or even of mundane legislation." In 1977, the Supreme Court in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,¹⁸ in requiring that an intent to discriminate in the genesis of a pre-act seniority system be established, made it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in seniority cases, but litigation continued.

Lichtenstein claims that he could find no evidence for this history. But that is an indication of his limited competence as a historian, as he obviously does not read litigation documents and related material. Instead, he relied upon a very limited selection of flawed secondary sources. Perhaps if Lichtenstein had heard the oral arguments and read the briefs of union lawyers in seniority cases as they repeatedly called attention to the "understanding" regarding the interpretation of Section 703(h) he might be better informed. The body of case law on this issue is extensive and Lichtenstein has simply ignored a vast amount of primary documentation while passing judgement on matters about which he knows virtually nothing.

Lichtenstein's Selective Silence

THE PROBLEM OF LICHTENSTEIN'S ARBITRARY CUT-OFF POINT IS REPEATED when he writes ". . . I chose not to comment on the state of affairs in the year 1975, half a decade after Reuther's death. . . ." It is true, as he explains in his book, that as a consequence of Reuther's efforts in 1945, Local 34 of the UAW in Atlanta admitted "black sweepers to membership . . . 120 black sweepers were formally enrolled in the local, but none won production jobs." Commenting on this, I wrote in my review "that 30 years later, with but one exception, blacks employed at this plant were still janitors, locked in a labor classification in the union contract that limited them to work only as janitors, with no possibility of promotion into jobs reserved exclusively for whites. Furthermore, this was the pattern in many UAW organized plants in the South and border states."

The only defense of the UAW Lichtenstein can muster in response to this history is to assert that "In Atlanta, like Memphis, Norfolk and Dallas, white unionists defended the segregation of African-Americans, keeping them confined to the janitorial work," claiming that local white unionists were to blame. Thus Lichtenstein tries to absolve the UAW leadership from the obligation to intervene. Not a word from Lichtenstein about the failure of the International Union to take action, not a word about the acquiescence of the UAW leadership. It was well known in the South that the UAW's civil rights policy could be violated with impunity and once again Lichtenstein simply evades the issue.

Lichtenstein claims that "Meany insisted upon an EEOC to give his office a new weapon with which to force integration of literally hundreds of still segregated southern locals." Commenting on this statement, I wrote "But there is no evidence in the 34 years since Title VII was enacted that Meany or the executive council of the AFL-CIO ever took action against affiliated unions that were violating VII." Although, the accuracy of his statement was directly challenged, Lichtenstein chose to ignore this issue. Here was an opportunity to prove me wrong, but not a word in response.

Here, as elsewhere, when race is the issue, Lichtenstein has no facts, no evidence, he just "knows" that "labor unions are a progressive force" that must be defended and on this basis he fabricates conclusions that are completely erroneous. This is a characteristic of Lichtenstein's writings on race and labor and that is why a review of his book devoted exclusively to his treatment of racial issues is required. Lichtenstein complains that "My biography of Reuther consists of 19 chapters and an epilogue. . . . Herbert Hill has chosen to focus only upon a small portion of that narrative. . . ." That was precisely my intention; to do a close analysis of Lichtenstein's treatment of race in the UAW with emphasis on organized labor's response to Title VII. With the exception of a brief comment in my conclusion about "Reuther's early years, including the period he worked as a machinist in the Soviet Union that readers will find of interest. . ." I deliberately limited my review and made this clear in the subtitle, "Meany, Reuther and the 1964 Civil Rights Act." Whatever virtues other parts of Lichtenstein's biography of Reuther may have, the egregious distortions in his treatment of race warrant special attention. I am aware that some reviewers identified with a Left perspective, such as Martin Glaberman¹⁹ and Michael Goldfield²⁰ have criticized other aspects of Lichtenstein's book, but although they too were critical of his approach on racial matters, the extent of his distortions, omissions and evasions in writing on this issue had not been intensively discussed before my review.

Lichtenstein's Fictions Revisited

IN MY REVIEW I QUESTIONED LICHTENSTEIN'S STATEMENT THAT IN 1960 ". . . the UAW began a more vigorous effort to desegregate southern and border-state UAW organized factories. . . ." I wrote "Lichtenstein offers no evidence for this statement and in fact there was no such vigorous effort." His rejoinder provided Lichtenstein with an excellent opportunity to refute my charge by providing some data, some evidence to sustain his statements about "a more vigorous effort." But he provides not a shred of factual information. Instead Lichtenstein engages in polemical fakery. He repeats his false statement and adds that "Hill is particularly vexed" by it and that I failed "to quote those lines in [Lichtenstein's] book which makes it clear that this initiative came as part of the Reutherite effort. . . ." But in fact there was no "effort," no "initiative" in the first place. It is one of Lichtenstein's fictions. This is the issue I raised in my review and invited Lichtenstein to provide some evidence to the contrary, but he has failed to do so. During the period in question I worked closely with dissident black groups in the UAW, and based upon my own experience, I can attest to the falsity of Lichtenstein's statement. However strongly he wishes that an "effort" should have been made, the record shows that no such "effort" occurred.

A major charge in my review was that even after Title VII went into effect, the UAW continued to negotiate contracts containing discriminatory provisions in violation of the law. For purposes of illustration I discussed United States v. Hayes International Corp.²¹ where a Federal appellate court found that under a 1965 UAW contract:

black employees performed the lowest paid, unskilled jobs. . . . This condition remained substantially unchanged even after the effective date of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The black employees were segregated in their jobs in a manner which deprived them of the opportunity for advancement that white employees enjoyed.

I wrote that in this case as in so many others:

the UAW violated its own formal civil rights policy, acting on behalf of whites in maintaining their privileged position in the factories. In 1957 the NAACP, assisting black UAW members, filed charges against Hayes International and the union with federal agencies seeking cancellation of government contracts because of the discriminatory racial pattern. During the eight year period between this action and July 2, 1965, the effective date of Title VII, the UAW, fully aware of the complaints filed, had ample opportunity to eliminate the system of racial job segregation codified in the union contract at Hayes and at other companies. Not only did it fail to do so, but it repeatedly renegotiated union contracts containing discriminatory seniority and job promotion provisions even after the Civil Rights Act became law. The Department of Justice, acting on charges filed by the NAACP on behalf of black workers, initiated a Title VII lawsuit against the employer and the union, both of whom were found to be in violation of the statute.

DURING THE COURSE OF HIS INTERVIEW WITH ME I indicated to Lichtenstein the significance of this record, because in all of these cases Reuther could have acted once Title VII became the law. He had the power within the union to insist that the UAW comply with the same law that the organization had, according to Lichtenstein, enthusiastically supported. This was not a civil rights issue in Mississippi far removed from the auto plants, here the UAW could have directly intervened and made changes in the racial employment pattern but did not do so. The fact that Lichtenstein is silent about this history speaks for itself.

In my review I documented the charge that Lichtenstein was repeating a fabrication when he asserted that "The trade union movement, both the AFL-CIO and the UAW was primarily responsible for the addition of FEPC, now rechristened the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to the original Kennedy bill. . . ." The evidence is incontrovertible that the bill Kennedy submitted to Congress did not contain a fair employment practices provision, the bill that Congress eventually enacted with Title VII was another bill, Johnson's bill, that reflected the influence of Randolph and Wilkins.²² Lichtenstein evidently thinks that if he repeats his argument enough times it will become true.

Furthermore, I argued that "An examination of the legislative history of Title VII and the conflicts that developed during the struggle for the 1972 amendments to the statute reveals a history of ambivalence, resistance and finally opposition to Title VII by organized labor, a history very different from Lichtenstein's version." Lichtenstein gives no evidence to refute my statement but instead accuses me of ignoring "the role played by the conservatives in shaping Title VII." This is no excuse for not responding to the issues I raised in my review.

It might be noted that I was reviewing Lichtenstein's book, not writing a comprehensive history of the statute. Elsewhere I have written in detail on these matters.²³ At several points, without any evidence, Lichtenstein implies that I fail to criticize conservative forces. I remind Lichtenstein that as NAACP Labor Secretary I filed literally hundreds of Title VII charges against major corporations (among these were General Motors, AT&T, Lockheed, United Airlines, U. S. Steel, etc.) and many of these became the federal court cases that were significant in the development of Title VII law. I continue this work now and frequently testify as an expert witness in federal court litigation against employers and labor unions responsible for job discrimination in violation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

In my continuing study of the black workers' experience with white organized labor, I have repeatedly raised the issue of union racism and refuted the myth of a progressive labor movement struggling for a better life for all people. I have documented the historical experience of black and other non-white workers with organized labor and revealed a record that contradicts the views of Lichtenstein and others who share his political ideology. This is the reason for the intense hostility that animates his rejoinder.

Lichtenstein As Apologist

LICHTENSTEIN IS INFURIATED THAT I REGARD HIM AS AN APOLOGIST for Walter Reuther, and to prove that I have maligned him he repeats in his rejoinder long passages from his book where he is critical of Reuther. These self-serving excerpts are entirely beside the point. I am aware that Lichtenstein criticizes Reuther in his biography and I made mention of that fact at several points in my review. I consider Lichtenstein to be an apologist, not a publicist or slavish sycophant. One can be an apologist for a social system, a party, movement, historic personality, etc., and still be critical. Indeed, it is criticism that is often used to give credibility to an apologia.

For example, Nelson Lichtenstein and the readers of New Politics remember that during the war in Vietnam there were many liberals, even Social Democrats and people of the Democratic Left, who looked upon the war as "tragic," were appalled by the dictatorship in South Vietnam, and critical of the Johnson Administration's conduct of the war, but for all their criticisms they remained nonetheless opposed to the unilateral withdrawal of American troops. They were, in effect, apologists for a war and a political administration of which they were indeed critical.

At the other end of the political spectrum there were those, including scholars and historians, who lamented the crimes of Stalin and Stalinism yet, at the same time, perceived Communist totalitarian societies as being historically progressive. For all their criticisms of the Gulag and the terror, these people were accurately described as apologists. Similarly, for all his criticisms of Reuther, Lichtenstein remains an apologist for the UAW leader. I not only established this in my review but it is clearly demonstrated by the fury with which Lichtenstein responds to my criticisms. Toward the end of his rejoinder and for all the lengthy excerpts from his book critical of Reuther we have this eulogistic overview:

Despite Reuther's many failures, both moral and political, his legacy nevertheless retains much of value because we judge him by a standard that is altogether higher than that of virtually any other major trade union leader of his time. This is because Reuther, unlike George Meany or David J. MacDonald or Jimmy Hoffa always aspired to make labor once again the core of a dynamic social movement. He saw the unions as a powerful lever with which to change the world.

This is not an apologia? How can one possibly say that Reuther "always" had such noble aspirations when the record is so clear to Lichtenstein as it is to me that Reuther never sought to make labor unions the core of a dynamic social movement. As if aware of how preposterous this apologia is Lichtenstein qualifies his assertion with the statement that "[W]hen he subverted that quest, in word or deed, we properly charge him with hypocrisy and opportunism." It is a qualification that cannot be taken seriously if for no other reason than it is utterly illogical. For if Reuther "always" aspired to such noble ends then logically he could never have "subverted that quest," at least not in the world where logic, reason and reading comprehension prevail.

Lichtenstein's Mythical Version of Organized Labor

I WANT TO RETURN TO LICHTENSTEIN'S ATTEMPT TO IMPALE MY ARGUMENT on his three-pronged rhetorical pitchfork when he says that Hill's critique is "disorganized, disjointed and ahistorical." While it is difficult to understand why he should consider so "disorganized and disjointed" a critique worthy of a 10,000 word "refutation," it is the charge that my review is "ahistorical" that I wish to comment on here.

Why "ahistorical"? Because, among other reasons, Lichtenstein finds my critique to be the latest chapter in an ongoing "effort to reduce the trade unions, both past and present, to little more than a white job trust." Though intended as a sarcastic and disparaging jab, I actually find "a white job trust" to be a well-turned and appropriate phrase, one I might borrow in the future. Lichtenstein, on the other hand, apparently believes the notion of unions as "a white job trust" to be a self-evident absurdity although he is surely familiar with the vast literature detailing the racial practices of a multitude of locals and international unions which did indeed operate as a white job trust, as some continue to do even today. In ridiculing the notion of unions as "white job trusts" in both the past and present, he is implicitly denying the rampant racism that was a characteristic of many of the affiliates and a high proportion of the leadership of the early American Federation of Labor. It was Gompers and the AFL which excelled in the choice of the most noxious racial epithets to vilify Chinese workers, as they shielded their "white job trust" from the contamination of black people and all others of color.²⁴ Sadly enough, even many social-democratic and socialist trade unionists were tainted, sometimes heavily coated with racist ideology. The fact is that the struggle for racial justice remains an uphill battle for black, Latino, and Asian workers not only in American society at large but in the trade union movement, as well.

I take strong exception to Lichtenstein's effort to paint me as someone who simplistically, and truly ahistorically believes that the entire trade union movement for the whole of this century has been and remains infected by racism. I am as aware as Lichtenstein that the racist beliefs of Gompers and his collaborators did not go unchallenged within the American Federation of Labor and that the history of American trade unionism is not confined to the AFL. There are, for example, the struggles of the IWW which recruited migratory laborers, foreign born workers, factory hands and thousands of black laborers, the most alienated and dispossessed, held in contempt by Samuel Gompers and the core craft unions in the AFL. No less than Lichtenstein do I pay homage to the memory of those union organizers who risked (and sometimes lost) their lives in campaigns to organize black and white sharecroppers in the South. I also know that A. Philip Randolph and his Sleeping Car Porters -- hardly a white job trust -- and the segregated locals and all-black auxiliaries were no less a part of the labor movement than George Meany and his lily-white Plumbers. I am sensitive to the differences in the 30s and 40s between the emerging CIO and the AFL. And although my criticism of the Reutherites allows for no apologias, I still do not equate the record of the UAW leadership, albeit disgraceful, with the overt racism of the railroad brotherhoods and the construction unions.

I have always been aware of the degree of diversity within the trade union movement; of its conflicts and contradictions, and of the pressures from within and without the organized labor movement that have ameliorated conditions for black and other workers, forcing open the doors of some "white job trusts," if only partially. Among the most effective of these pressures have been struggles by dissident groups within unions, collaborating with concerned organizations outside the labor movement. It is Lichtenstein who invents a trade union movement that never was, as when he writes that "Over the sweep of the 20th century, trade unions have been, generally speaking, a progressive force in American life and social policy." Lichtenstein no doubt feels that he has delivered himself of a pithy, sweeping historical overview of the trade union movement. To my way of thinking, it is "generally speaking" a fanciful flight from reality.

It is important to remember that the labor movement Lichtenstein sums up is not defined by DeLeonists in the weak Socialist Trade and Labor Alliance waging war against capitalism, or by Wobblies fighting company goons and AFL bureaucrats or by any of the militant struggles from the turn of the century to its end, including the struggles waged by P-9 workers against both the meatpacking industry and labor officialdom, and the efforts of Teamsters for a Democratic Union today. To make his case coherent and historical, Lichtenstein has to demonstrate that it was the mainstream of the American trade union movement -- the AFL, the AFL-CIO, the UAW as an autonomous organization, and the contemporary unified labor movement -- that fought the good fight for political and social justice.

This is a challenge that neither Lichtenstein nor anyone else can possibly meet. As if aware of the difficulties in supporting his euphoric generalization, he qualifies his assurances with the hedging phrase, "generally speaking." If it is only true "generally speaking" that the labor movement served as an agent of social justice and political progress, that means specifically speaking there were times when the labor movement played a more dubious, even reactionary role. I would suggest to Lichtenstein that even a quick survey of the record of the labor movement in this century reveals that "generally speaking" it has taken positions which were anti-democratic and anti-social, often in violation of the needs and interests of its membership and the working class at large.

On questions of war and peace, from the Spanish-American War to the war in Vietnam, on questions of foreign policy, on issues of civil liberties, on the movement for women's rights from the suffragettes to women's liberation, on independent political action, on the struggle for racial justice, the labor movement "generally speaking" took positions which contradict Lichtenstein's mythical version of organized labor as a progressive force in American political and social life.

Impoverished Labor History

IN MY REVIEW I STATED THAT "Lichtenstein's explanation for Reuther's behavior, as when he admits that the UAW, in refusing to integrate its executive board, by 1959 lagged behind other industrial unions," that "Reuther had become a prisoner of the institution he did so much to construct." In commenting, I wrote that "Lichtenstein offers this impoverished formulation as a catch-all excuse for Reuther's deplorable positions on racial and other issues and he fails to acknowledge that Reuther had options and made choices. . . ." In his rejoinder, Lichtenstein again fails to discuss the issue I raised. I characterized Lichtenstein's statement as impoverished because it explains nothing about the complex nature of the individual's relation to institutions and society. Human agency is never simply the product of bureaucratic formations over which individuals have no control as Lichtenstein suggests. My use of the word "impoverished" was also meant to convey my opinion of the quality of thought in Lichtenstein's work.

Over a period of many years and in many contexts I have challenged the distortions in the treatment of race by labor historians and have criticized the "impoverished" quality of their work. A major issue in my writing is the history of white working class and union racism, and the way it is frequently misrepresented by labor historians. Thus, in many respects this argument between Lichtenstein and myself is a continuation of earlier battles regarding the work of labor historians, especially that of Herbert Gutman.²⁵

Commenting on the scholarship in Gutman's influential essay "The Negro and the United Mine Workers of America,"²⁶ Nick Salvatore recently wrote:

In a devastating critique that leaves Gutman's historical veracity in tatters, Hill revisited Gutman's sources, noting in painful detail the truncated citations or entirely omitted letters in Gutman's handling of the primary evidence. All too often, what is at stake, Hill notes time and again, is not a different emphasis or a subtle meaning rather the very core of Gutman's argument. My own independent check of both of their footnotes leaves little doubt but that Hill was accurate in his demolition of Gutman's historical research and of the argument that grew from it. In his charge to overturn those traditional interpretations and replace them with a new synthesis based on a class analysis of American society, Gutman traduced the historians fundamental responsibilities. That is the burden of Herbert Hill's critique.²⁷

Salvatore's summary of my analysis of Gutman's essay, might with some variations, be applied to the work of other new labor historians as they manufacture myths and engage in distortions about the racial practices of labor unions.

For many generations organized labor excluded blacks and other non-whites, and even later when they were admitted into some unions, continued to discriminate against them after they were granted union membership. Today we have the sorry spectacle of Lichtenstein and other new labor historians eliding union racism from the historical record. Needless to say, Lichtenstein and the others do not elide union racism completely. How could they? But they try to reduce its importance while they exaggerate the significance of the rare exception. They try to explain away racist behavior even as they lament it as an unpleasant chapter in an otherwise glorious history.

Charles Mills, in his book The Racial Contract²⁸ posits a "racial contract" in opposition to the social contract that is relevant to this discussion. He writes:

Unlike the social contract, which is necessarily embarrassed by the actual histories of the politics in which it is propagated, the "Racial Contract" starts from these uncomfortable realities. Thus it is not, like the social contract, continually forced to retreat into illusory idealizing abstraction, the never-never land of pure theory, but can move readily between the hypothetical and the actual, the subjunctive and the indicative, having no need to pretend things happened which did not, to evade and to elide and to skim over.²⁹ (Emphasis added)

Why this need "to evade and to elide and to skim over?" The answer can be found in the second paragraph of Lichtenstein's rejoinder. He construes my criticism of his book as an "effort to reduce the trade unions, both past and present, to little more than a white job trust" and frets that this "does a disservice both to the history of America's working class movement and to the possibility of a genuinely progressive trade union revival." As noted earlier, this is what motivates Lichtenstein's writing, and as a consequence, he finds it necessary to minimize racism in labor history because these inconvenient facts sully an imagined past that he wishes to recover. He and others like him are engaged in constructing a usable past to serve the current labor leadership. To this end the racism of the white working class and of its unions must be denied or reduced to the margins of history.

Even if I grant Lichtenstein his dubious premise about the prospects for a progressive trade union revival, this goal will not be served by burying the ignominies of the past. Rather, if this alleged revitalized movement is going to be progressive, it must come to terms with the past, not by burying the truth, but by confronting it fully and acknowledging, without temporizing, injustices that were done. These were tragic not only for the non-white victims of union racism, and not only because they perpetuated and exacerbated the racial divisions that continue to afflict American society, but also because they betrayed the ideals of organized labor itself, and the possibility that it would be a genuinely progressive force in a racially divided society.

There is another problem, however. Lichtenstein knows that his compatriots in the "new" labor movement have no intention of confronting labor's sordid history on race. To do so would carry a moral and political obligation for the labor movement to commit itself to genuine racial inclusiveness in leadership as well as in membership and to initiate a sustained attack against the racism that still permeates many unions. Here, alas, "past" and "present" come together.

Just as the labor movement by uncritically retelling labor's story does not want to confront the fact that for many generations it was a white labor movement, labor historians are guilty of producing a white narrative -- that is, one that reflects a white point of view, and that "evades and elides and skims over" the unpleasant realities of race, then and now. Lichtenstein's perspective on this entire history would be turned inside-out if, even as a mental exercise, he put himself in the place of those black workers who confronted the patently discriminatory practices of the UAW and other labor unions. Were he to assume the vantage point of the racial other, he would not treat race as a minor chapter in an otherwise epic story. It is perhaps worth repeating here, that in my review I deliberately challenged only one aspect of Lichtenstein's book, just because he gave the issue of racism short shrift does not obligate me as reviewer, to repeat his error.

Lichtenstein ends his book with a triumphant flourish that contradicts much of what he has written in the previous 444 pages. Having consulted a necromancer who knows 25 years after Reuther's death what his position would be regarding current labor union policies, Lichtenstein writes that "Reuther emphasized that a sense of justice and solidarity underlies the very essence of the union idea," and strongly suggests that were Reuther alive today he would be leading the charge for a militant labor movement. This, of course, is sheer nonsense, and is one more example of how Lichtenstein writes history to serve his political agenda.

Waiting For Lefty!

IN THE PENULTIMATE PARAGRAPH OF HIS REJOINDER, Lichtenstein, now playing the role of the tough "Lefty," declares that unless "we put our political cards on the table," our debate is no more than an exercise in "scholastic pedantry." One might assume, in the light of such a statement, that Lichtenstein would follow up with a pointed summary of his political position. What we get instead is an approximately 100-word tribute to Walter Reuther, revealing nothing about Lichtenstein's so-called political cards, now presumably on the table. The tribute to Reuther is followed by an equally brief concluding paragraph informing the reader that after a twenty-five year hiatus Walter Reuther has finally found an heir in John Sweeney, who is committed, at least rhetorically, to the notion that for trade unions to survive they must "transform themselves to once again [?] become the core of an expansive social movement."

Lichtenstein's prose and spirit soar as he brings the good tidings that the new leadership has placed the stamp of approval on "a long-overdue, multi-racial definition of how we conceptualize the American working class," a statement in which I find only empty rhetoric, but in which Lichtenstein finds a development that is "enormously healthy."^** Thus though he anticipates that Sweeney may disappoint us in many particulars, and in fact may "fail utterly," we are nonetheless assured that the Left now enjoys a larger space in which to project its "ideas" and "initiatives." With a final rallying cry urging us to "seize the opportunity," Lichtenstein concludes his political discussion and his rejoinder to my review.

What "ideas" and what "opportunities"? And toward what social and political end should we "seize the opportunity"? Lichtenstein does not say. I am left with no alternative therefore but to stand by my view that Lichtenstein's treatment of race in the Reuther biography as well as in his defense of it, confirms Nell Irvin Painter's considered judgment that "The new labor history has a race problem."³⁰

 

Notes

* The Brief amicus curiae of the EEOC in a 1969 case against the Steelworkers Inion and the Timken Roller bearing Company in Ohio describes the union's racist practices in a northern plant five years after the adoption of Title VII. The EEOC's amicus brief states, "The seniority provisions of the current collective bargaining agreement are indicative of the long standing rules, jointly formulated by the Defendants, which effectively freeze Negroes into the low paying, dead-end jobs. Defendants jointly adopted a 'departmental' seniority system whereby an employee's seniority for the purposes of promotion, transfer, etc., is based on his length of employment in a given department. If a negro who was hired in 1952 as a janitor wishes to transfer to an all-white production department, where pay and chances for advancement would be greater, he would lose all his accumulated seniority and be treated as a new hire in the all-white department. Thus, under pain of losing their 'departmental seniority,' negores are effectively prevented from transferring from their menial jobs to more desirable departments" (Head et al. v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F. 2d 870 [6th Cir. 1973]. See Brief amicus curiae of EEOC, Statement of the Case, filed Aug. 15, 1969). return

** Of course, John Sweeney, as head of the AFL-CIO is not precisely the same man who, for many years, headed the corrupt Local 32-B 32-J of the Service Employees International Union in New York City. (See Bob Fitch, "Sweeney Among the Warlords," and Michael Hirsch, "Job Selling at the Janitors' Local": New Politics, Winter 1997.) He does make overtures to social activists, intellectuals, and the young. For all that, the image of Sweeney as a born-again visionary dedicated to transforming unions so as to make them the core of an "expansive social movement" is but another of Lichtenstein's fictions.

Social unionism is inseparable from the cause of trade union democracy. And the cause of trade union democracy is alien to the Sweeney leadership. More than three years have passed since the Sweeney forces took control of the AFL-CIO and the union movement remains bureaucratic, often corrupt and disgraced by discriminatory race and gender practices. return

---

1. For a detailed account of racial issues in the ILGWU during the 1950s and 60s see Herbert Hill, "Black-Jewish Conflict in the Labor Context: Race, Jobs, and Institutional Power," in African-Americans and Jews in the Twentieth Century: Studies in Conflict and Convergence, edited by V.P. Franklin and Genna Rae McNeil, University of Missouri Press, forthcoming. return

2. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Second Annual Report, 1968, pp. 43-44. return

3. 380 U.S. 1 (1965). return

4. For a discussion of this practice and its effect, see Herbert Hill, "On the Use of the amicus curiae Brief by the EEOC," an unpublished paper given at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, University of Minnesota, May 20, 1978. Copy in the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison. For a discussion of early Title VII litigation, see Herbert Hill, "The New Judicial Perception of Employment Discrimination: Litigation Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," Colorado Law Review, Vol 43, No 3, March 1972, pp. 243-268. return

5. For an example of the consequences to black workers of segregated seniority and job promotion lines in a unionized industry, see Robert J. Norrell, "Caste in Steel: Jim Crow Careers in Birmingham, Alabama," Journal of American History, Vol 73, No 3, December 1986, pp. 669-94. return

6. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E. D. VA. 1968). return

7. 416 F. 2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969). return

8. 559 F. 2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977). return

9. 429 F. 2d 498 (5th Cir. 1970). return

10. 560 F. 2d 224 (7th Cir. 1977). return

11. 686 F. 2d 586 (7th Cir. 1982). return

12. 645 F. 2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1981). return

13. 836 F. Supp. 1552 (M. D. ALA. 1993). return

14. 490 U.S. 900 (1989). return

15. 446 F. 2d 652 (2nd Cir. 1971). return

16. 468 F. 2d 1201 (2nd Cir 1972). return

17. 451 F. 2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971). return

18. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). return

19. Martin Glaberman, "Walter Reuther and the Decline of the American Labor Movement," International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol 11, No 1, 1997, pp. 73-99. return

20. Michael Goldfield, "On Reuther: Legends and Lessons," Against The Current, #67, March-April 1997, pp. 31-37. return

21. 415 F. 2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969). return

22. Among many other sources see "The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission during the Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson" (unpublished document, Nov. 1, 1968, in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Tex., p. 5), Legislative History of Titles VII and XI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1966, pp. 8-10, Charles Whalen and Barbara Whalen, The Longest Debate: A Legislative History of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Cabin John, M.: Seven Locks Press, 1985, p. 22, 82-83, and Robert Mann, The Walls of Jericho, Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, Richard Russell and the Struggle for Civil Rights, New York, Harcourt Brace & Co., 1996, pp. 386-392. return

23. See for example, Herbert Hill, "The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts of 1964 and 1972: A Critical Analysis of the Legislative History and Administration of the Law," Industrial Relations Law Journal, Vol 2, No 1, Spring 1977, pp. 1-96. Also Herbert Hill, Black Labor and the American Legal System, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1985, especially chapters 1 and 3. return

24. For a description of the racist AFL campaigns against Asian workers during the Gompers' period, see Herbert Hill, "Anti-Oriental Agitation and the Rise of Working-Class Racism," Society, Vol 10, No 2, January-February, 1973, pp. 43-54. return

25. See Herbert Hill, "Myth-Making As Labor History: Herbert Gutman and the United Mine Workers of America," International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol 2, No 2, Winter 1988, pp. 132-200. return

26. Herbert Gutman, "The Negro and the United Mine Workers of America, the Career and Letters of Richard L. Davis and Something of Their Meaning: 1890-1900," in The Negro and the American Labor Movement, edited by Julius Jacobson, Anchor Books, Garden City, 1968, pp. 49-127. Reprinted in Gutman, Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing America, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1976, pp. 119-208. return

27. Nick Salvatore, "Herbert Gutman's Narrative of the American Working Class: A Reevaluation," International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol 12, No 1, Fall 1998, pp. 43-80. return

28. Charles W. Mills, The Racial Contract, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1997. return

29. Ibid. p. 130. return

30. Nell Irvin Painter, "The New Labor History and the Historical Moment," International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol 2, No 3, Spring 1989, p. 369. return

Contents of No. 26